PREDATORY PRICING AND RELATED PRACTICES UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT t
Phillip Areeda * and Donald F. Turner *"
A firm may reduce its prices in an attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry. Although the Sherman Act has long been construed to prohibit this practice, the case law on predatory pricing has been characterized by vagueness and a paucity of economic analysis. In this Article, Professors Areeda and Turner analyze the predatory pricing offense in terms of its economic underpinnings. After briefly reviewing the fundamental economic concepts of costmeasurement and profit-maximization, the authors examine the relationship between a firm's prices and its costs in order to define a rational dividing line between legitimately competitive prices and prices that are properly regarded as predatory. They then apply their analytical framework to possible techniques of predation other than general price reductions.
ALTHOUGH antitrust law is not usually concerned with setting a limit on price competition, under certain conditions low prices may have anticompetitive effects. A firm which drives out or excludes rivals by selling at unremunerative prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in behavior that may properly be called predatory. There is, therefore, good reason for including a "predatory pricing" antitrust offense within the proscription of monopolization or attempts to monopolize in section 2 of the Sherman Act. ' Treatment of predatory pricing in the cases and the literature, prices. We will first review some rudimentary economic distinctions among various measures of cost and their relevance to profit-maximization. We will then discuss which measurements of cost should be used to determine when a firm is engaging in predatory pricing. Finally we will examine predatory devices other than general price reductions.1l
I. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF COST 12
The economic costs facing a firm differ in an important respect: some are "fixed," and others are "variable." Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with changes in output. They typically include most management expenses, interest on bonded debt, depreciation (to the extent that equipment is not consumed by using it), property taxes, and other irreducible overhead. And though not an accounting cost, fixed costs should be deemed to include the return on investment that would currently be necessary to attract capital to the firm -what the economist refers to as the opportunity cost to the owners of the firm. In short, it is reasonably accurate to say that fixed costs are costs that would continue even if the firm produced no output at all.
Variable costs, as the name implies, are costs that vary with changes in output. They typically include such items as materials, fuel, labor directly used to produce the product, indirect labor such as foremen, clerks, and custodial help, utilities, repair and maintenance, and per unit royalties and license fees. The average variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output.
Marginal cost is the increment to total cost that results from producing an additional increment of output. It is a function solely of variable costs, since fixed costs, by definition, are costs unaffected by changes in output. Marginal cost usually decreases over low levels of output and increases as production approaches plant capacity.13
Average cost is the sum of fixed cost and total variable cost, divided by output. It is, by definition, higher than average variable 11 The bulk of our analysis focuses on what should be deemed to be a predatory practice by a monopolist, since that is the "worst case." Practices acceptable for the monopolist are a fortiori acceptable for firms with less market power. However, we shall also indicate the respects in which nonmonopoly firms should have wider latitude.
12 See generally R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS (2d ed. I972). 13 If variable costs are strictly proportional to output, marginal cost will equal average variable cost at all outputs. If not, marginal cost will be lower than average variable cost at some (usually low) outputs and higher at other (usually high) outputs.
[Vol. 88:697 700 cost at all outputs, but will typically be below marginal cost at very high levels of output, when the plant is strained beyond efficient operating capacity.l4 Which costs are fixed and which are variable (and hence marginal) is a function of both (i) the magnitude of the contemplated change in output, and (2) time. Virtually all costs are variable when a firm, operating at capacity, plans to double its output by constructing new plants and purchasing new equipment. Moreover, more costs become variable as the time period increases. The variable costs described above are those incurred in what is usually termed the "short run," namely, the period in which the firm cannot replace or increase plant or equipment. Conversely, in the "long run" the firm can vary quantities of all inputs (plant and equipment as well as shortrun variable inputs); thus, all costs are variable over the long run.5 -In order to determine which of these various costs is relevant to predatory, "below cost," selling, we must first ask what costs are relevant to the firm which is seeking to maximize profits or minimize losses, since a firm which seeks to do so is normally responding to acceptable economic incentives and thus is not engaging in predatory behavior. The profit-maximizing or lossminimizing output for any firm, whether competitive or monopolistic, is that where any increase in output would add more to costs than to revenues and any decrease in output would reduce revenues more than costs. In short, in deciding whether it would increase or decrease output, the firm looks to the incremental 14 
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effects on revenues and costs. Thus, the relevant cost is marginal cost.16 Under conditions of perfect competition, a firm always maximizes profits (or minimizes losses) by producing that output at which its marginal cost equals the market price.17 This occurs because the perfectly competitive firm accepts the market price as given since it is, by definition, too small to affect market price by any variations in output. Accordingly, its incremental or marginal revenue from selling any additional unit of output is equal to the market price itself. Thus, when price is equal to marginal cost, changes in output will reduce profits. This solution in the perfectly competitive world also produces an efficient allocation of resources: market price reflects what consumers are willing to pay for the last unit of output; marginal cost reflects the full current cost of resources needed to produce it; a higher price would result in a reduction in output and thus deprive some buyers of a commodity for which they were willing to pay the cost of production.'8
The firm with monopoly power, however, has, by definition, captured a sufficiently large part of a market to determine market 16 Since fixed costs do not vary with changes in output, they are irrelevant to a determination of the profit-maximizing or loss-minimizing output. The size of the fixed costs determines only whether, at the best output, the firm will earn excess, normal, or below-normal returns. Of course, if the firm can at best make below-normal returns, and the prospects remain the same when the time comes for plant or equipment to be replaced, the rational firm would not make the reinvestment and its output would decline or cease. But at the time that such a decision is made, the fixed costs would no longer be fixed but would have become a part of variable cost, since they would then be affected by variations in output. 17 If, however, price is below average variable cost at all levels of output, the firm can minimize losses only by ceasing operations. Since the average cost of production of each unit is greater than the revenue realized from its sale, any output greater than zero increases the firm's losses. At price P1 on the diagram in note 14 supra, the loss-minimizing firm will shut down. 18 The following diagram shows the profit-maximizing price for the perfectly competitive firm: Since the firm is unable to affect price by changes in its output, it faces a horizontal demand curve. The firm maximizes profit when price (Pc) is equal to marginal cost (MC).
[Vol. 88:697 702 price by varying its output. For the monopolist facing the usual "downward sloping" demand curve (and unable to engage in significant price discrimination), an increase in output will reduce the market price. Thus, the incremental revenue to the monopolist from selling an additional unit is the lower price received for that unit, minus the revenue lost from selling all other units at the lower price. For him, therefore, marginal revenue is always below price, with the result that the output at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue will generate a price that exceeds marginal cost.19 The monopolist's price is thus higher, and its output lower, than the social optimum; any higher output and lower price would be an improvement in resource use up to the point where, as in a competitive market, price equals marginal cost.
II. PREDATORY PRICING IN GENERAL

A. The Problem
We are now able to characterize more precisely the predatory pricing problem. We would normally expect a profit-maximizing firm, within the limits of data and convenience, to attempt to maximize profits or minimize losses in the short run -the competitive firm by producing where marginal cost equals price, and the monopolist by producing where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The firm that is selling at a shortrun profit-maximizing (or loss-minimizing) price is clearly not a predator. A necessary, but, as we will subsequently argue, not sufficient condition of predation is the sacrifice of shortrun profits. The monopolist maximizes profit when marginal revenue (MR) is equal to marginal cost (MC). Thus, in the illustration, the profit-maximizing monopolist will produce quantity Qm and sell at price Pm, which is higher than marginal cost.
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Shortrun profit-maximizing may adversely affect profitability in the longer run. A firm may correctly calculate that shortrun losses will be more than repaid by the higher monopoly prices that can be charged after competitors have been driven out. Accordingly, longrun profit-maximizing should not be an absolute or automatic defense to allegedly predatory, shortrun profitsacrificing. However, not all deliberate sacrificing of shortrun profits is illegitimate. A firm may voluntarily assume shortrun losses in situations where monopoly is neither sought nor possible, and where, as in the case of a new entrant seeking to become established in a market, such action promotes rather than retards competition. Thus, a standard based upon shortrun profit-maximizing is not an adequate means of defining the legitimate price floor for firms in general. Indeed, even for a monopolist, a profitmaximization standard is inappropriate. Definition of a proper price floor requires an understanding of the relationship between a firm's prices and various measures of cost.
B. Prices At or Above Average Cost
When price is equal to average cost, the firm is at the "break even" point -that is, total revenues just cover total costs, including normal returns on investment. The relationship between price and average cost does not, however, determine whether a firm is profit-maximizing; sit shows only whether the firm is making excess, normal, or below-normal returns.
When a monopolist sells at a price at or above average cost, but could earn higher shortrun profits at a higher price, the necessary element of predation is presumably present.20 Unless acting irrationally or out of ignorance, the firm is likely to be charging the lower price in order to preserve or enhance its market share by deterring rivals.21 Such pricing may take two forms: (i) the 20 When a firm sells at a price below average cost it is incurring a loss. The mere fact that the firm is not recovering full costs, however, is not grounds for concluding that its price is predatory. Losses are sometimes inevitable; demand conditions may dictate that a firm earn its maximum net revenue over variable costs at a price below average cost. For example, in the diagram in note 14 supra, a firm may be loss-minimizing at price P2. While not recovering full fixed costs, such a firm is not sacrificing available present returns for any anti-competitive objective. The shortrun, loss-minimizing price cannot, therefore, be considered predatory or otherwise objectionable by antitrust law. This proposition will not resolve many real cases. It will be exceedingly difficult to know what is or is not a loss-minimizing price. Nevertheless, the proposition is an important one in principle, for it serves to remind us that the defendant's failure to earn profits or even to recover his full cost is not necessarily objectionable. 21 The firm may also be keeping price down to reasonable levels during periods of high demand in order to preserve customer goodwill.
[Vol. 88:697 704 PREDATORY PRICING 705 firm may permanently charge less than a profit-maximizing price in order to deter entry or to destroy rivals; or (2) it may first charge a profit-maximizing price, lower the price when rivals appear, and then raise the price when the rivals are extinguished. However, in both instances, we conclude that such pricing behavior should be deemed non-predatory so long as the prices equal or exceed average total cost. Our analysis of each variation follows. In each instance we assume that the price is equal to or greater than both average cost and marginal cost.22 i. Limit Pricing. -A monopolist protected by an insurmountable barrier to the entry of others can charge whatever price will maximize his profit. The ability of other firms to overcome entry barriers may, however, affect the monopolist's price. To oversimplify a bit, suppose that the monopolist's profit-maximizing price is $Ioo per unit, but a $Ioo price would attract entry while a $90 price would not. Average total costs (including a normal return on investment) at an efficient scale of output might be $80 to the monopolist but $9I for newcomers. In that event, the monopolist will have to choose between inducing entry at the profit-maximizing price of $Ioo and retaining the entire market at the $90 price. If the discounted income stream at the lower price exceeds that from sharing the market at the higher price, the monopolist will charge the lower price. Although the lower price would thus be the longrun, profit-maximizing price, it is usually called a "limit price" and contrasted with the higher, shortrun, profit-maximizing price determined without reference to possible entry.23
The limit price is intended by the monopolist to impair the opportunities of rivals, and, if successful, it does prevent competition from arising. In the absence of limit pricing, competition might arise and force the price down to the former limit price or even lower, if the presence of additional firms induces cost paring, reduction of "slack," and, in the long run, more efficient production. Without limit pricing other benefits of competition may also arise. More firms in the market might, for example, lead to more invention and innovation and a quicker dispersion of existing innovations throughout the economy.
We do not, however, believe that these arguments justify a prohibition against limit pricing. Superior products or service, successful innovation, or other effective competition on the merits always tends to exclude rivals. Without them, more competitors might arise and eventually achieve comparable or better results, 22 The unusual case where price equals or exceeds average cost but is less than marginal cost is discussed at pages 712-I3 infra. but we do not accept such speculative possibilities in exchange for the present benefits of superior competitive performance. Exclusion by charging prices equal to average cost is also competition on the merits -only those potential entrants who cannot survive at the efficiency-related price are kept out.24 And the lower prices, higher output, and fuller use of the monopolist's productive capacity are, of course, socially beneficial.
In sum, without even considering the formidable administrative problems which supervising a monopolist's pricing policies would impose,25 we conclude that more-or-less permanently "low" prices are competition on the merits and not an abuse of power or exclusionary behavior for the purposes of section two of the Sherman Act.26 2. Temporary Price Reduction to Average Cost. -Where entry is easy and relatively costless, the monopolist would have to maintain the lower price to forestall renewed entry. But where a new entrant must make a large investment in facilities, personnel training, distribution development, or product promotion, he will not enter without the prospect of survival for a period sufficiently long to recover at least those initial costs. The potential entrant who cannot survive at a price covering the monopolist's costs will not, therefore, enter when he thinks it probable that the monopolist will adopt that lower price in response to entry. If the monopolist reduces his price once or twice, he will discourage future entry. In such circumstances, monopoly may be maintained without a permanent price reduction, and thus consumers will not receive the long-term benefit of the higher output at lower price by which rivalry was destroyed or prevented. This result is certainly not a happy one.
Nevertheless, despite the loss of long-term benefits to consumers, this case is analytically indistinguishable from the preceding case. Temporary price reductions are no more exclusionary than permanent low prices, and may be even less so since some entrants may have the staying power to meet the monopolist's temporary, low price. In either case, the low price at or above 24 Similarly, only less efficient, existing rivals will be eliminated by the monopolist's limit price.
25 See pp. 707-09, 711 infra. 26 Our conclusion that it makes no legal sense to compel a monopolist to invite entry by exploiting consumers, or to force a firm to forego price competition on the merits with existing rivals is no less applicable when a firm permanently reduces an earlier and higher price to a price at or above average cost even though he would earn larger, shortrun profits at the higher price. The fact that a firm once restricted output or exploited buyers, generates no social interest in continued exploitation. Moreover, the fact that the lower price is relatively permanent provides some assurance that the firm is making a normal return, since otherwise it would be unlikely to maintain the lower price.
706
[Vol. 88:697 average cost is competition on the merits and excludes only less efficient rivals. Even if this were not fully convincing we would still conclude that temporary price reductions in response to rivalry or threatened rivalry should not be judged unlawfully exclusionary under the Sherman Act because of the formidable administrative problems in attempting to control such temporary price reductions adequately, efficiently, and without interfering unduly with desirable pricing behavior.
We see no satisfactory method of control. One might try to forbid the high monopoly price and thereby assure that consumers always have the benefit of competitive prices. There are, however, serious theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what is a "reasonable" (nonmonopoly) price, as the history of public ratemaking makes painfully manifest. Determination of a reasonable price would require continuing supervision as cost, demand, and technological functions change. Antitrust courts have rightly resisted undertaking the heavy, continuous, and unguided burden of supervising the economic performance of business firms.27 Moreover, a monopolist whose power was legitimately acquired by patents cannot be denied monopoly profits without subverting the purpose of the patent laws. Similarly, denying monopoly profits to those whose power was obtained by superior skill, foresight, and industry could eliminate the primary incentive to develop such competitive skill. Finally, price restrictions would have perverse effects on the efficiency and innovation aspects of a monopolist's on-going performance by eliminating the reward.28
Alternatively, one might try to forbid a monopolist from lowering his price below the price charged by a rival or announced by 27 The conclusions of the Supreme Court in rejecting a "reasonable price" defense to a price-fixing agreement are equally apposite here:
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions. Moreover, in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable -a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (I927).
28 For a discussion of the relationship between monopoly and innovation see Finally, one might forbid the reversal of a price decrease and thereby either discourage temporary price reductions from the outset or at least give consumers the permanent benefit of the lower prices by which a monopolist destroyed his rivals or prevented their entry. Although this method is perhaps the most feasible, we feel that it should be rejected for a number of reasons. First, forbidding reversal of a price decrease would greatly increase the likelihood that a monopolist would elect to forego the price reduction and maximize his monopoly profits until such time as entry or expansion of rivals eliminates them. Foregoing the reduction would encourage the entry of less efficient rivals.
Second, enforcement of such a rule would require adjustments to cope with subsequent changes in costs or demand. Most obviously, the price ceiling would have to be raised with an increase in such factor costs as wage rates or materials, or with an increase in demand that could only be met at marginal costs above the price ceiling. In such events, failure to raise the ceiling would result either in (i) uneconomically high output (where price is less than marginal cost) or (2) insufficient output to meet the demand at the ceiling price, which would in turn lead to private rationing or a "gray" market in which resales took place at higher prices. 29 See p. 716 & note 41 infra. 30 Alternatively, the pricing constraint on the monopolist might be maintained until new entrants or rivals had acquired a specified market share. Such a limit, however, would not only encourage entry of less efficient firms seeking to take advantage of a guaranteed market share, but would also provide an incentive for rivals to restrict output just short of the specified share in order to maintain high prices. Moreover, enforcing a price ceiling would raise the problem of reduced profits or even losses for the monopolist in the event of a decrease in demand. Theory might suggest no relief or even a price reduction, on the ground that if competition had not been excluded the same result would have obtained. But it is at least doubtful that so ruthless an approach would be acceptable even under legislatively authorized "public utility" regulation. And such a policy would further discourage a monopolist from making any price reductions.
In sum, a rule forbidding reversal of a price reduction would impose on enforcement agencies and the courts administrative burdens that are not justified by the speculative benefits such a rule might bring. Accordingly, we conclude that a price at or above average cost should be demed non-predatory, and not in law exclusionary, whether permanent or not.
We are under no illusions that a rule permitting prices at or above average cost is easily applied. Average cost includes a "normal" return on investment, a figure usually not determinable with any precision. But the principle that average-cost pricing is legitimately competitive is an important one and may serve to dispose quickly of cases in which the alleged predator's rate of return is normal by any reasonable test.31
C. Marginal-Cost Pricing
In the previous Section we considered the threat to rivals and new entrants posed by a price that is profitable to the monopolist but not to the rival. In some instances, however, the monopolist's price may both generate below-normal returns -that is, it may be below average cost -and be below the loss-minimizing price. Because such a price yields less than the normal return on capital, it can threaten the survival of equally efficient rivals with less staying power than the monopolist enjoys. We will consider these loss-producing prices in two categories: (i) those equal to or greater than marginal cost and (2) those less than marginal cost. i. Prices At or Above Marginal Cost. -At the outset we can eliminate from our consideration situations in which the monopolist is producing beyond the output at which his plant functions most efficiently, since at such high levels of production, marginal cost will exceed average cost. In such cases, pricing at or above marginal cost will not eliminate equally efficient rivals or potential 31 The district court in Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. I973), apparently failed to recognize this principle. Despite a lack of evidence that IBM reduced prices below cost and a reasonable profit, and despite IBM's anticipation of returns "in excess of 20%," the court found that IBM had engaged in predatory pricing. Id. at 306.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW entrants, who may freely restrict their ouput to efficient levels, and thus make substantial profits at the monopolist's price.
We need consider, then, only instances when marginal cost is below average cost, a situation which will not occur unless the monopolist possesses "excess capacity." 32 Only then will the monopolist's marginal cost price deprive equally efficient rivals, actual or potential, of "normal" returns on their capital.33
Although narrowed, the problem remains: the equally efficient rival might be destroyed or dissuaded from entering not because he is less efficient but because he has less capital. Consider two illustrations. First, suppose that the monopolist occupies an entire market by himself and that his plant has excess capacity. Suppose further that the monopolist could maximize profits at a price exceeding average cost but chooses to dissuade entry by pricing at marginal cost, which is now below average cost. Although it may preserve a monopoly, this price seems socially appropriate, because the construction of additional capacity where excess capacity already exists would waste social resources. Indeed, a price higher than marginal cost would yield a smaller output and would waste present resources. Existing capacity, that could be used to produce at a cost less than the added value to consumers, would be idled. Second, suppose that (i) a monopolist and his smaller rival have identical cost curves, (2) both have been producing at full capacity and earning significant profits, (3) demand falls during a temporary, two-year recession, (4) the monopolist would maximize profits at a price above average cost, (5) the monopolist chooses to price at marginal cost, which is now below average cost, (6) the rival has insufficient liquid resources or access to new capital to cover his losses and service his capital debt, (7) the rival thereby expires, (8) his assets and business are withdrawn from the market, and (9) subsequent new entry is difficult. In this set of circumstances, marginal-cost pricing by the monopolist does not merely discourage the addition of immediately redundant capacity, but has the effect of destroying an equally efficient rival.34 32 A firm has excess capacity (and marginal cost is below average cost) when the demand curve intersects the average cost curve to the left of minimum average cost, i.e., prior to the point where marginal cost equals average cost. 33 We also do not consider here loss-minimizing prices below average cost. As we have noted, see note 20 supra, such prices lack the predatory element of sacrificing current revenues. 34 This illustration is not meant to suggest that facts number four and number five will actually occur with any frequency; nor is it inevitable that the rival will fail to ride out the recession, that his assets will in fact be withdrawn from the [Vol. 88:697 710 PREDATORY PRICING Nevertheless, we conclude that prices at or above marginal cost, even though they are not profit-maximizing, should not be considered predatory. If a monopolist produces to a point where price equals marginal cost, only less efficient firms will suffer larger losses per unit of output; more efficient firms will be losing less or even operating profitably. Admittedly, the destruction of an equally efficient rival, and the deterrence of entry of firms' which are equally efficient, poses some threat to competition in the long run; if demand increases to its former level, only the monopolist will occupy the market which he formerly shared with the rival. However, we see no satisfactory method of eliminating this risk. Establishing a price floor above marginal cost would permit survival not only of equally efficient firms, but less efficient ones as well. And in the short run, at least, entry even by equally efficient firms will be undesirable since excess capacity already exists.
Furthermore, to force the firm to charge a higher price would reduce industry output and waste economic resources in the short run. Output that could be produced at a cost lower than its value to consumers would be eliminated. Thus, pricing at marginal cost is the competitive and socially optimal result.
Finally, enforcement of a prohibition against marginal-cost pricing would create serious administrative problems. If the monopolist were prohibited from dropping his price down to marginal cost, then some price floor above marginal cost would be required. Such a floor should be set no higher than a monopolist's loss-minimizing price since a higher price is not predatory and would require the monopolist to incur greater losses. Yet, a floor so defined would be more difficult to administer or comply with than a marginal-cost floor. Difficult as it may be for a firm to calculate marginal cost, it is vastly more difficult to calculate in advance what the loss-minimizing price would be. In addition to marginal costs, the firm would have to estimate what the shape and position of its demand curve will be, which would in turn require an estimate, among other things, of the price and output responses of rivals to various prices it might charge. To hold the monopolist responsible, after-the-fact, for reasonable miscalculations would be an intolerable burden, and encourage a highprice policy in order to be safe. And it is likely to be nearly as difficult to make after-the-fact determinations of what would have been the loss-minimizing price as it was to make them a priori.
Thus, we conclude that a prohibition of marginal-cost pricing industry, or that reentry will be difficult. Nevertheless, we are posing a testing case in order to examine the principle that marginal-cost pricing should be considered lawful. We have concluded above that marginal-cost pricing by a monopolist should be tolerated even though losses could be minimized or profits increased at a lower output and higher price, for the reasons, among others, that marginal-cost pricing leads to a proper resource allocation and is consistent with competition on the merits. Neither reason obtains when the monopolist prices below marginal cost. The monopolist is not only incurring private losses but wasting social resources when marginal costs exceed the value of what is produced. And pricing below marginal cost greatly increases the possibility that rivalry will be extinguished or prevented for reasons unrelated to the efficiency of the monopolist. Accordingly, a monopolist pricing below marginal cost should be presumed to have engaged in a predatory or exclusionary practice. 37 We would make one exception to this rule, namely, when the price, though below marginal cost, is at or above average cost. 35 It is possible that a firm may temporarily reduce its price to marginal cost in order to punish competitors for shading its higher price. If the firm's marginalcost price merely meets that of its competitors, we see no justification for finding a predatory offense. Meeting a rival's price with a price above marginal cost is competition on the merits and prohibition of that practice would coerce a firm into giving up a portion of its market share whenever rivals choose to cut their prices.
Price reductions below that of a rival are more objectionable, but even here identification of the violation will be difficult in many instances. In an oligopoly situation it would be difficult if not impossible to distinguish "disciplinary" pricecutting from an outbreak of competitive pricing under the pressures of excess capacity. It would be plainly perverse to impose a constraint on competitive pricing, and thus reinforce the innate tendencies of oligopolists to maintain noncompetitive prices by cooperation or collusion.
When a monopolist engages in temporary marginal-cost pricing to discipline small rivals, predation is more easily inferred. Nevertheless, because of the difficulties of drawing the lines between monopoly and oligopoly and between "meeting" and "beating" a rival's price, see note 41 infra, and because of the administrative problems inherent in setting any price floor above marginal cost, we conclude that disciplinary price cuts to levels above marginal cost should be disregarded. 36 See note I7 supra. 37 Because of the substantial problems involved in determining a firm's marginal cost, we suggest below that average variable cost be used as a surrogate for marginal cost in distinguishing between predatory and non-predatory prices. See pp. 7I6-I8 infra.
[Vol. 88:697 712 PREDATORY PRICING This is not justifiable "on principle," since production to the point where marginal cost exceeds price is wasteful whether or not price exceeds average cost. Nevertheless, practical reasons suggest that the case can be disregarded, for it seems unlikely to have any significant anticompetitive consequences. The case could occur, by definition, only when demand exceeds what the firm can produce at minimum average cost. If the excess demand is temporary, there is little need for new entry. If permanent, pricing below marginal cost, with its consequent high output,,may have some deterrent effect on new entry and some adverse effect on existing rivals. The harmful effect, however, will be minimal, since the price is higher than the monopolist's average cost at most efficient levels of output, and equally efficient rivals or entrants would be making above-normal profits at that price.38 Thus, it is unlikely that the monopolist would continue that pricing policy for any substantial length of time, because the prospects of recovering profits lost through attempted predation would be dim.
Pricing above average cost is, however, the only exception we would make to a prohibition of below-marginal-cost prices. A monopolist may attempt to justify prices below marginal cost by claiming either that the price is being used for promotional purposes or that he is simply meeting an equally low price of a rival. We conclude, however, that these justifications are either so rarely applicable or of such dubious merit for a monopolist that the presumption of illegality for prices below both marginal and average cost should be conclusive.
(a) Promotional Pricing. A promotional price is a temporary, low price designed to induce patronage with the expectation that the customer will continue purchasing the product in the future at a higher price. The promotional price may be below cost and is most easily illustrated by the seller who gives his product away without charge to some or all would-be customers.
Unless continued over a long period of time, in which case it is no longer promotional, promotional pricing by new entrants or small firms without monopoly power threatens little or no harm. Promotional pricing can facilitate new entry or the expansion of small rivals in an industry dominated by one or a few large firms. Entrenched consumer loyalties to established brands constitute barriers to entry and to a small firm's growth. For new or even established firms, promotional pricing serves the purely informational function of advertising by alerting consumers to the existence of new products. The low promotional price is preferable to advertising, for it gives the consumer a better buy during 38 See pp. 709-10 supra.
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7I3 the period of promotion and allows him to judge the product on its merits. Of course, the promotion may on occasion temporarily divert demand from better products or more efficient producers, but the diversion will last only long enough for consumers to judge and reject the inferior, promoted product.39
The monopolist can make no such case for promotional pricing. His promotion would not usually intensify competition but would only decrease it-existing rivals will be damaged or driven out, and new entry deterred. In contrast to new entrants or small rivals, he has little need to resort to extreme price reductions to acquaint existing consumers with the merits of his brand.40
The only other apparent arguments a monopolist could make are (i) that pricing below marginal cost is necessary to raise the overall market demand by attracting new customers who have not heretofore known or been interested in the product or (2) that it is necessary to enable a firm with declining costs to move to a more efficient level of output. The arguments might be held to justify selective reductions to new customers or in new geographical markets, but as a defense to a general price reduction to present as well as new customers, we find these arguments unpersuasive.
As to the first argument, it is possible but seems highly improbable that an established monopolist would find a general price reduction below marginal cost worthwhile solely because it attracts new customers to the market and thus generates a permanent increase in market demand. The monopolist has a number of alternatives for achieving this goal besides pricing below marginal cost. First, a marginal-cost price itself would ordinarily be a substantial reduction below the shortrun profit-maximizing price for any firm with significant monopoly power, and would thus have a substantial promotional effect. Second, the monopolist may be able to make selective price reductions to marginal cost to new customers or in new geographical areas and thus minimize his shortrun losses from the promotion. Finally, there are the alternatives of selective advertising or other sales efforts. The general price-cut will inevitably draw customers away from rivals as well as attract new buyers, and the effect on those rivals and on new entry will be more severe than any of the alternatives. 39 After short-term promotion, a firm might eventually become so dominant as to obtain monopoly power, but it would have obtained its power because of competitive superiority, and the mere fact that the initial promotion got the firm going is no reason for condemning the promotion. 40 It is conceivable that some consumers may have acquired strong loyalties to the brands of small rivals without ever having purchased the monopolist's product. In such event, promotional pricing by a monopolist might be thought defensible. But we consider the case too unlikely to warrant recognition given the risks of abuse that allowing the defense would entail.
[Vol. 88:697 7I4 PREDATORY PRICING We find the declining costs justification for promotional pricing equally unconvincing. Pricing below marginal cost might be rational for a brief period of time for a new producer of an existing product with a very large and much more efficient plant that could supply the entire market at an average cost well below those of existing producers. Similarly, a new producer with a monopoly on an entirely new product might also find it rational to set an initial price below the high marginal costs incurred at early low outputs. But no defense is needed for these declining cost cases. They can be taken care of by a sensible interpretation of the rule that a monopolist is entitled to price at or above reasonably anticipated marginal costs. In other words, to establish predatory pricing, it should be necessary to show that a monopolist has priced both below immediate marginal cost and below the marginal cost at the output which he reasonably anticipated he would attain within a reasonable period of time.
(b) Meeting Competition as a Defense. -We would not permit a monopolist to price below marginal cost in order to meet the lawful price of a rival. Although there are grounds for permitting him to price below marginal cost in order to meet a rival's unlawful price, the administrative difficulties presented by the necessity of distinguishing the two cases are so great as to lead us to reject the defense altogether.
The first proposition, although questionable, seems correct, particularly where the rival is a new entrant. The fact that the rival's low price may be legitimately promotional, and hence a proper competitive tactic, does not make legitimate the response of a monopolist whose product is already well known. The monopolist who goes below marginal cost to meet a rival's promotion is not competing on the merits; the response will destroy or greatly reduce the effects of the rival's promotional effort, a result likely to be particularly serious for the new entrant, whose usual problem is precisely that of obtaining a profitable volume quickly enough to make start-up losses bearable.
The monopolist might attempt to justify a below-marginalcost price to meet a rival by claiming that he believed he could rapidly reduce his costs to or below those of his rival, and that it would cost him less to hold his organization and patronage intact than to recover them in the future. This contention, however, would be made in every case, and it would be difficult for the monopolist to know or the court to determine that the monopolist could achieve cost parity, that it would be less expensive to suffer such interim out-of-pocket losses than to bear the future costs of rebuilding his organization and recovering lost patronage, or indeed, that there would be any such future costs at all. Furthermore, the complex problems of defining meeting-rather-than-beat-I975]
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ing the rival's price would have to be faced.41 Courts would have to undertake the difficult task of assessing differences in product quality and thus become involved in speculation about consumer preferences.
There is some basis for allowing a monopolist to meet a rival's unlawful price. The rival's unlawful price is not competition on the merits, and there is no strong reason for denying even a monopolist the opportunity to defend himself from predatory attack. Retaliation may possibly increase the waste of productive resources in the short run, but it is likely to serve the useful purpose of bringing the predator's unlawful pricing to a quicker end. Nevertheless, we would reject even this limited defense for the monopolist when his price is below marginal cost. The administrative problems of defining a price that meets the rival would be further compounded by the need to determine whether the rival's price were indeed unlawful. There is, after all, consolation for the monopolist in his relative security from serious injury at the hands of a smaller rival unlawfully pricing below marginal cost, in the relative infrequency of that challenge to him, and in his ability to bring a private antitrust suit for injunction or damages.
D. Average Variable Cost as a Surrogate
for Marginal Cost In our analysis of predatory pricing we have concluded that marginal-cost pricing is the economically sound division between acceptable, competitive behavior and "below-cost" predation. Thus, we have suggested a prohibition of prices below marginal cost. The primary administrative impediment to enforcing that prohibition is the difficulty of ascertaining a firm's marginal cost. The incremental cost of making and selling the last unit cannot readily be inferred from conventional business accounts, which typically go no further than showing observed average variable cost. Consequently, it may well be necessary to use the latter as an indicator of marginal cost.
An average variable cost rule, like a marginal cost rule, should be flexible enough to allow a defendant to demonstrate that its price was equal to or above a reasonably anticipated average variable cost. A firm may legitimately determine its price and output levels according to expected future costs rather than historical accounting costs. Of course, historical costs may be the 41 
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The consequences of substituting average variable cost for marginal cost depend on the relationship between the two cost measurements. Marginal cost may be equal to, below, or above average variable cost: marginal cost will be equal to average variable cost when the latter is constant, less when it is declining, and greater when it is rising. By reference to the marginal-cost standard, accordingly, reliance on average variable cost may be identical, more prohibitive, or more permissive.
There is no a priori reason to expect any particular firm to be operating at the point where marginal cost equals average variable cost,42 but when the two costs measures are identical over the relevant range of output, employing one as a proxy for the other plainly raises no difficulties.
Whenever unit variable cost declines as output expands, the marginal or incremental variable cost of the next unit is necessarily less than the average of the preceding units. Thus, whenever a firm can reduce unit variable cost by expanding output, a price at average variable cost must exceed marginal cost.43 Although an average variable cost standard is more prohibitive in these circumstances, it is the correct test on principle, since a firm that sells below its average variable cost is clearly not lossminimizing. At a price less than average variable cost the firm is earning no return and could incur fewer losses by ceasing operations.44 The primary nonpredatory justification for prices below 42 For the usual firm, average variable cost falls and then ultimately rises as output expands. At its low point, the average variable cost curve will be intersected by marginal cost. At that output or range of outputs, the two will be identical. 43This might occur (a) over the entire range of outputs in declining cost industries or (b) over that portion of a firm's output preceding the full realization of those economies of scale implicit in its plant in the short run or in industry technology over the long run. The first case is the "natural monopoly" and is relatively rare. The second situation may describe a firm opening a new plant that has not yet won its way in the market. It may also describe a firm with declining demand that has forced production to be cut back well below the efficient scale at which it previously operated. In sum, average variable cost will typically exceed marginal cost only when a plant is operating below efficient use of capacity.
44 See note 17 supra.
I975] PREDA TOR Y PRICING
average variable cost is that the firm is just starting up and has not yet reached expected production levels. Firms in this situation, however, will not be in violation of a rule that prohibits prices below reasonably anticipated average variable cost. When marginal cost exceeds average variable cost, adopting the latter as the standard runs the risk of allowing a firm to sell at a price below marginal cost while meeting the average variable cost standard. Thus, the surrogate is even more permissive than our exception from marginal cost pricing when the price is at or above average cost.45 Nevertheless, a permissive exception is justified for similar reasons. Marginal cost is likely to be higher than average variable cost only when output nears the firm's optimum.46 When capacity is thus strained, predation is especially unlikely, since the loss of profits would be most severe and new demand could not be easily absorbed by the predator. Moreover, given the relatively rare occurrence of predatory pricing, we believe that a slightly permissive rule is acceptable since the threat of litigation under any rule on predatory pricing is more likely to discourage proper pricing than predation, and the benefit of any doubts should go toward protecting the seller, instead of increasing his vulnerability.
In sum, despite the possibility that average variable cost will differ from marginal cost, it is a useful surrogate for predatory pricing analysis.
E. Predatory Investment in the Monopoly Market
In theory, the principles applied to define shortrun predatory pricing are applicable to the longer run when funds are invested or reinvested in plant and equipment and hence become part of marginal cost. If it is appropriate to permit a monopolist to expand output in the short run to the point where marginal cost equals price, it should be equally appropriate to permit him to expand capacity to the point where longrun marginal cost equals price, even though that expansion reduces his overall rate of return and even though it limits or forecloses the opportunities of rivals or new entrants. Similarly, if it is appropriate to condemn a monopolist for pricing below marginal cost in the short run, it would seem equally appropriate to condemn him for adding new facilities when he anticipates that the revenue to be obtained from 45 See pp. 712-13 supra. 46 Whenever unit variable cost increases as output expands, the marginal or incremental variable cost of the next unit is necessarily more than the average of the preceding units. This occurs when output nears the optimum for which the plant was designed, thus requiring the use of less efficient manpower or other resources, or exerting upward pressure on factor prices (e.g., the payment of overtime wage rates).
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Nevertheless, while we adhere to the first proposition, we reject the second and believe that antitrust law should ignore the possibility of predatory investment in a monopolized product. Our reasons are two. First, construction and perpetuation of excess capacity would be extremely costly, particularly if it fails to deter new entry or expansion of rivals. Investment for predatory purposes is thus an extremely unlikely possibility. Second, the practical difficulties of attempting to distinguish between innocent and predatory expansion are much more severe than those of evaluating shortrun pricing.
Our suggested test for shortrun predation is pricing below reasonably anticipated average variable cost. The firm knows the price it is currently charging; and though "reasonable anticipation" is not precise, it should not pose serious difficulties in application. The firm knows its recent variable costs and should become quickly aware of any substantial changes in such cost elements as wages or materials. However, when a firm is attempting to determine its probable return on new facilities over their useful life, it faces uncertainties of a much higher order. It cannot be sure as to the long-term future course of wage, material, and other variable costs. Nor can it be certain of the prices it will be able to charge over the life of the new facility; accurate estimates of future market-wide demand for its product are difficult, if not impossible, to make with precision, and the firm has no control over, or perhaps even knowledge of, construction or expansion of capacity by others or the development of new substitutes for its product. Thus, there is little basis for inferring predation from the fact that a monopolist has invested in new facilities which later turn out to be unprofitable.
When a monopolist does have excess capacity, it is almost certain to have innocent explanations: (i) new capacity becoming operational sooner than expected; (2) failure of demand to grow as much as anticipated; (3) unanticipated declines in demand attributable to general economic fluctuations or to unexpectedly serious competition from producers of the same or substitute products; (4) increased variable costs; or (5) modernization that substitutes new, lower-cost capacity for old facilities that are worth maintaining for peak demands or as break-down reserve. We can see no workable rule that will satisfactorily distinguish between these legitimate cases of excess capacity and cases of predatory investment. Even a narrow prohibition, requiring clear proof of a deliberate choice to invest despite the anticipation of losses, would subject innocent firms to the threat of baseless but I975] 719 costly litigation. We do not believe that the slight possibility of predation justifies the potential abuse of a rule against predatory investment.
To conclude that there should be a rule against predatory pricing but not against predatory investment requires that a workable line be drawn between the short run and the long run. In theory this is difficult since fixed costs become variable over a continuum,47 but we think that the issue is practically resolvable. Since the offense is limited to predatory pricing, the relevant question is which costs were variable during the period of alleged predation. Normal accounting procedures will usually supply the answer: costs charged as a direct expense should be treated as variable; costs charged as an investment for depreciation and tax purposes should be treated as fixed. A firm is not likely to alter its accounting procedures in order to validate shortrun predatory pricing. And if it does, or if it has unusual accounting procedures well before the period of alleged predation, it would have a heavy burden of explanation.48
III. PREDATION IN OTHER CONTEXTS
Our discussion in Part II has focused on the problem of predation in a firm's general pricing policy. Devices other than a general price-cut may, however, be the subject of suits for predation. A firm may cut its prices on only selected products or in a few geographical markets. Or a firm may engage in practices that force rivals to raise costs above price in order to maintain their market shares. In this Part we will examine four possibly predatory practices: earning differential returns (including "predatory investment" in new products), price discrimination, excessive promotional spending, and excessive product variation. Despite the different forms of these practices, in most instances the analytical framework developed in Parts I and II will serve to distinguish between predatory and nonpredatory behavior.
A. Differential Returns on Different Products
When a firm earns a different return on its investment in different product lines there may be some concern that the lower rate of return reflects predatory pricing in that product line. shortrun case is that of differential returns on unrelated products. This might occur in the conglomerate firm situation, in which the subsidiaries or divisions of a single firm produce a number of unrelated products. One would not expect all divisions of a firm to be earning the same return at any particular time; temporary variations in demand and costs in different industries will most likely result in some differences in returns. Moreover, when the firm has a monopoly in one of the products, it is not unusual for it to earn substantially more on that product than on those it sells in competitive markets. Thus, the mere fact of differential returns proves nothing of any antitrust significance regarding the firm's pricing policy.
Of course, to use the common but usually misapplied description, a firm may be "subsidizing" low returns in a competitive market with higher returns on a monopolized product. But as long as a firm is turning a profit on each additional sale, a subsidy is not necessary. Thus, just as in the case of the single-product monopolist, illicit pricing can be established only by showing that in the competitive market the firm is pricing below marginal cost or the "surrogate" average variable cost.
Even when it appears that the monopolist has priced below average variable cost in the competitive market for an unrelated product, he should be entitled to any defenses -such as "promotional" pricing -to which a nonmonopolist would be entitled. The monopolist, using revenues from the monopolized product, might be thought more likely to indulge in "excessive" promotional pricing than a single-product producer. But revenues from monopoly are no different from superior resources derived from any other source and their existence should not affect the determination of whether the below-marginal-cost price is indeed promotional.
The more difficult case of shortrun differential returns arises when the product earning a lower return is related to a product on which the firm has a monopoly. The products may be related in that they are produced with some common facilities, are sold to and used together by the same consumers, or both. In this situation marginal-cost pricing on the competitive product may adversely affect firms that are the most likely potential rivals in the monopolized-product market. By applying pressure through 1975] 721 marginal-cost pricing on the firms in the competitive market, entry into the monopoly market may be deferred or completely discouraged.
Yet this raises no issues that we have not already covered. If the related-product market is competitive, marginal-cost pricing is the norm and should not be discouraged. If the firm has monopoly power in the related-product market, the question is the same as that raised by marginal-cost pricing by any monopolistwhether possible gains from an umbrella price are worth the shortrun economic costs of under-utilization of resources and the severe administrative difficulties of applying a test other than marginal (or average variable) cost.49 2. "Predatory Investment" in New Product Lines. -To this point, we have been discussing differential returns on different products in the short run, that is, where the monopolist has already invested in plant and equipment. Suppose the monopolist invests or reinvests in facilities in the "competitive" line in expectation of earning an aftertax return of, say, ten percent as compared to the twenty percent he has been earning in the monopoly line. In so doing, he may have an exclusionary purpose, namely to impair the capacity of potential rivals to enter the monopoly field by keeping them under competitive pressure in their particular line. But what may appropriately be deemed illegally "exclusionary" is neither easy to specify nor easy to prove. The difficulties with a predatory investment rule that we discussed earlier in connection with investment in the monopoly line50 are applicable here and are, we believe, dispositive. But there are other problems as well.
The monopolist may have nonexclusionary reasons for making the new investment. Notwithstanding the past profit rate in the monopolized product, investment in the competitive line might be an equally or more profitable choice quite apart from any exclusionary effects. Additional investment and output in the monopoly may so reduce prices and profits that the marginal return on the new investment would be ten percent or less. Moreover, investment in the competitive line might contribute more to profits than is shown by the estimated revenue-cost relationship on that line only. The ability to offer a fuller line of complementary products may increase the sales of each, either because consumers prefer to deal with a single seller or because the fuller line enhances the seller's image. Finally, even though the new investment might appear to be less profitable than additional investment in the monopoly line, it is possible that it is rational when the two antici-pated rates of return are discounted for risks. The monopolist may stand to lose more from possible invasion of his monopoly line than he would from adverse developments in the competitive line, or adverse developments may be more likely in the former.
Even if the new investment would appear to be less profitable after taking risks into account, it should not be deemed predatory so long as the expected return equals or exceeds the "normal" return for the product line concerned. To be sure, the "opportunity" cost of the monopolist's capital is measured by the rate of return, say fifteen percent, that could be earned on an alternative investment in the monopoly line. And, unlike the case of the monopolist engaged in shortrun marginal-cost (or below profitmaximizing) pricing, which leads to a better use of resources, it would appear to be a misuse of capital resources to devote them to a less profitable pursuit. But it simply makes no sense to adopt a rule forcing a monopolist to invest further in production of the monopolized product merely because the rate of return exceeds the expected return on alternative product-line investments. Such a rule would have the effect of forcing profits on the monopolized product down toward a competitive rate of return, like the maximum price constraint we have earlier rejected; 1 or it would eliminate monopolists as potential entrants in other product lines, which would in turn protect high profits and restricted output in those lines. Moreover, prohibiting the monopolist from investing in alternative product lines would be inefficient when there are economies in product integration.
If the monopolist can earn a normal or higher return on the new investment: (i) the rivals are earning supranormal profits (or would be if he did not invest); (2) he is more efficient than they; or (3) his continued presence or new entry is on too small a scale to have any effect on them. If the monopolist's entry would have no effect, there is no reason to stop him. If he is more efficient, his entry is to be encouraged. If rivals in the competitive line are earning high returns and capital markets are imperfect, they might more easily enter the monopoly product line, but it is not at all clear that the possibility of competition in the monopoly line outweighs the disadvantages of protectionism in the competitive line.
The case against a monopolist's investment which is expected to generate below-normal returns is stronger. Logically it is as predatory for a monopolist to invest in a competitive line in the expectation of receiving below-normal returns as it is for him to engage in shortrun pricing below marginal cost. Prohibition of such a practice, however, would be hindered by all the difficulties 51 See p. 707 supra.
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